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Abstrat
Over the past deade, high performane omputational (HPC) lusters
have beome mainstream in aademi and industrial settings as aessible
means of omputation. Throughout their proliferation, HPC seurity has
been a seondary onern to performane. It is evident, however, that
ensuring HPC seurity presents dierent hallenges than the ones faed
when dealing with traditional networks. To design suitable seurity mea-
sures for high performane omputing, it is neessary to rst realize the
threats faed by suh an environment. This task an be aomplished by
the means of onstruting a omprehensive threat model. To our knowl-
edge, no suh threat model exists with regards to Cluster Computing. In
this paper, we explore the unique hallenges of seuring HPCs and pro-
pose a threat model based on the lassial Condentiality, Integrity and
Availability seurity priniples.
1 Introdution
Cluster omputing now onstitutes over 60% of the top 500 high performane
omputing resoures in the world[12℄, with top-performing lusters suh as
IBM's Blue Gene reahing peak speed of over 180 TFlops aross more than
65,000 nodes [13℄. HPCs are used for a variety of researh and industry tasks
many of whih are either mission-ritial or sensitive by nature, making lus-
ters an attrative target for industry espionage or sabotage. Additionally, the
luster itself, with its highly desirable resoures suh as powerful omputational
apaities, high-bandwidth network onnetion and massive storage, whih an
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be employed for a DoS attak, brute fore password raking[8℄ or illegitimate
FTP servers, make it an attrative target for attakers. An example of suh
an attak took plae in spring of 2004, when attaks on failities in multiple
institutions took plae [4℄.
Attempts to seure the luster omputing environments urrently suer from
lak of an integrated seurity approah that takes advantage of the intrinsi
properties of luster omputing. Applying traditional seurity measures to in-
dividual nodes of the luster is an inadequate measure, as it fails to take into
onsideration the overall ontext of the system. For example, a node may be
ommuniating on a port that appears legitimate to the seurity system running
on that node. If the seurity system were able to interfae with the sheduler, it
would learn that no job is sheduled to be running on that node, therefore there
should be no ommuniation taking plae[15℄. In order to be able to dene a
omprehensive approah to seuring a luster, we must rst strive to ompletely
understand the threats and seurity risks that are present in luster omputing
environment.
The best approah to analyzing the threats faed by a omputing environe-
ment is through a systemati threat-analysis approah, or threat modelling.
Threat modelling involves systematially identifying the assets in the system,
reating an arhitetural overview of the system, and identifying the threats at
eah stage of the system[5℄. One the threats are identied, a risk assesment
analysis is performed to determine whether it is more eient to mitigate the
threat or aept the risk of it being exploited. Seurity mehanisms are then de-
veloped to mitigate the threats whih are determined to be unaeptable. This
proess allows seurity engineers to eetively identify whih seurity measures
are neessary. This ensures that the neessary mehanisms are put in plae,
while the unneessary ones are left unimplemented[3℄.
The purpose of this paper is to eetively and omprehensively identify the
threats faed by luster omputing
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. We hose to use the lassial Condential-
ity, Integrity and Availability (CIA) seurity model, a well-aepted and time-
proven paradigm in the seurity ommunity, as a basis for our threat model.
We disuss the unique aspets of a lustered omputing network as ompared to
traditional networks, and how the hallenges these aspets present within the
framework of the CIA model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst
attempt to use a strutured CIA approah to reating a omprehensive threat
model for lusters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2 we disuss
the unique aspets of luster omputing as they relate to seurity assurane.
In Setion 3 we briey survey the previous work on dening a omprehensive
luster seurity model. We then disuss our threat model in setion 4 of the
paper, and oer a summary and some onluding remarks in setion 5.
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The risk assessment portion of the seurity analysis proess depends in large part on the
workload and data sensitivity of eah individual luster, as well as details of its arhiteture,
and as suh, best left for the luster administrator to perform.
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2 Seurity Challenges of Cluster Computing
As high speed omputing ontinues to shift from mainframe to ommodity CPU
lusters, it is important to note several emerging properties in this new om-
puting environment, whih diretly ontribute to the diulty in maintaining a
seure omputing environment.
2.1 Clusters are highly ustomizable
Clusters an be thought of as high speed networks of ommodity proessors.
As suh, there is not a single denition of what a typial luster 'prole' is.
Varied fators among lusters inlude node quantity, CPU and hipset hoie,
operating system, luster management software, suh as Roks and OSCAR,
and interonnet, suh as Inniband, Myrinet and many others[2℄.
2.2 Clusters are often highly heterogeneous
Frequently, lusters are deployed inrementally, and with dierent omponents.
As suh, lusters an often be found to ontain a highly heterogenous mix of
hardware devies and software ongurations. This presents a seurity hallenge
that is both loal and distributed. On one hand, eah distint onguration has
unique needs in terms of pathing and node hardening. On the other hand, lak
of homogeneity hinders deployment of integrated seurity solution aross the
whole luster [10℄.
2.3 Performane-First mentality
Clusters are designed to be a high performane omputing tool. As suh, it
is a ommon pratie to maximize the performane potential and aessibility
of lusters, often at expense of seurity. One suh example is the pratie of
exposing all of the luster's nodes to publi networks in order to allow users to
login diretly to omputing nodes and run their jobs. The emergene of luster
grid omputing and on-demand omputing has aenuated this problem, sine
these paradigms require all nodes to be aessible to outside onnetions for
optimal eetiveness. Another example is disabling SSH authentiation between
nodes to redue job start up time.
2.4 Edge-based seurity measures model
As part of the performane-rst paradigm desribed above, seurity measures
in lusters, suh as seure authentiation login are often onentrated along the
edges of the luster. As a result, one an attaker gains aess to the luster,
there may not be signiant obstales to what he an do inside.
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2.5 Cluster size
As lusters grow in size, it beome inreasingly diult to guarantee seure state
operation in every one of the omponents. Inreasing the size of the luster
also inreases the attak spae and heightens the possibility that a deteremined
attaker an loate and exploit a possibility in the system to gain aess to one
of the nodes. Given the seurity oversight disussed in previous setion, nding
one vulnerable node is often all an attaker needs.
These aspets learly dierentiate lusters from lassial network seurity
realms. As a result, luster seurity annot be addressed in the same way
that tradional network seurity is addressed. In light of the fat that a luster
presents a very dierent set of hallenges to both attakers and seurity engi-
neers, and ontains vastly dierent set of assets to potential attakers, luster
seurity must be examined within the framework of a dierent threat model
than one faed by traditional networks.
3 Previous Work
To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done on developing a ompre-
hensive threat model for luster omputing, to the best of our knowledge. In
[7℄, the authors dene a threat model for Grid omputing at a very high level
and without fousing on the spei seurity hallenges of the lusters that are
outlined in this work. In [14℄, three spei attaks on lusters are presented.
In [10, 15℄, the unique properties of luster seurity are addressed, and a limited
threat model, along with a proposal for an integrated luster seurity tool is
given.
4 Attak Identiation
To reate a strong threat model of a system, several questions must be addressed.
The rst step of developing a threat model is to identify the potential assets
of the system. An asset in threat modeling is dened as an entity or a feature
of a system that is of interest to the attaker, and as suh, gaining aess to
these assets is the motivation behind the attak [11℄. It is the ase, however,
that assets represent entities or features that are desired for legitimate users
as well, therefore it is not a pratial approah to eliminate the motivation for
attaks by eliminating the assets. Seondly, we must identify potential entry
points into the system whih an be exploited by the attaker in order to gain
illegitimate aess. Entry points an be intentional, suh as a publi login
sript, or unintentinal, suh as an open port or a buer overow vulnerability
in a running library. Finally, given the existing assets and entry points, we
enumerate what attaks an be launhed in order to gain aess to eah given
asset.
It is imperative to follow the above steps when designing a threat model.
Threat modeling requires a systemati and repeatable approah, whih is not
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ahievable by simply brainstorming the question How an I be attaked? [6℄.
One must onsider not only the assets at risk and the vulnerabilities of the
system, but also non-tehnial questions, suh as, who is going to be launhing
the attaks (defaers, industrial spies, sript kiddies, et.), and what is the
motivation behind the attaks (nanial gain, aess to omputing resoures,
et) [3℄.
A few words on our attaker model. We refer to anyone who wishes to ir-
umvent the normal operation state of the luster as an 'attaker'. This is a
diverse qualiation that an inlude a bored teenager haking from home, a
maliious haker attempting to steal ondential information from the luster,
a disgrunted employee, or a legitimate, but dishonest luster user who is at-
tempting to get more luster resoures at the expense of other users. Though
these people may have very dierent goals in mind, we group them together as
potential attakers.
We hoose to lassify attaks on lusters using the Condentiality-Integrity-
Availability threat lassiation. CIA seurity model is a seminal lassiation
model in information assurane studies and provides a more lear-ut separation
than newer, alternative models suh as STRIDE [11℄.
Assets. As we have briey mentioned already, a large-sale luster is highly
attrative to attakers both for the data ontained in it and the physial re-
soures that it provides. We identify the following assets in the luster that an
attaker might try to get aess to.
• User login data
• User job data
• System logs
• Sheduler
• Storage systems
• Intranode network fabri
• Computing yles
• Network pakets
Entry Points. Given the hallenges of seuring lusters we've disussed in
setion 2, there are many entry points whih the attaker might utilize to om-
promise the luster. These inlude,
• Known vulnerabilities in SSH
• Remote luster management software
• Open ports
• Stolen login information
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• Rogue proesses/rootkits
We now present the CIA threat model for luster seurity. To do so, we desribe
how the enumerated entry points an be used in order to gain aess to lus-
ter resoures in order to launh attaks against Condentiality, Integrity and
Availability of the luster.
4.1 CIA Model
The Condentiality-Integrity-Availability model is an attrative way to dier-
entiate attaks. The three properties of the model are key aspets that must be
guaranteed in a seure omputing system. Although there may be some over-
lap in how an attak an be ategorized (for example, a ondentiality attak
an also be an intergrity attak), we hoose to group attaks to a single group
expliitly
4.1.1 Condentiality
Condentiality ensures that only the entities autorized to read information and
aess resoures an do so. Condentiality attaks fous on gaining aess to
resoures without having the proper authorization to do so[9℄. Gaining illegit-
imate root aess to the system represents the ultimate ondentiality attak,
however, an attaker may still learn muh without the apability to login to the
luster.
• Snooping on External Network. Cluster users are frequently allowed to
submit jobs over the network. This presents a number of snooping oppor-
tunities. An attaker may learn when a ertain user is running a job (and
on whih node, if the user is allowed to onnet to ompute nodes diretly).
An attaker may attempt to apture user data being transferred onto the
luster, or orrelate input/output transmissions to infer information about
the size of the job the user is running.
• Snooping on Internal Network. Messages on the internal luster network
are often left unenrypted for eieny reasons. If a maliious insider
attaker manages to gain aess to the ommuniation fabri, or by ap-
turing a node and putting it in promisuous mode, an attaker an easily
interept data and ontrol pakets.
• Sheduler/Metadata Compromise. If an attaker manages to get adminis-
trative aess to the head node of the luster, he will be able to examine
sheduler logs and job metadata information to learn about urrently run-
ning jobs and what jobs have users run in the past.
• Resoure Subversion - Computational. An attaker who has gained aess
to a single luster node, may, unless the luster is speially ongured
to disallow this, bypass the sheduler altogether and launh a job from
shell. This grants the attaker unauthorized aess to the omputational
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resoures of the luster, enabling him to perform illegitimate tasks suh
as hashing values for an oine ditionary attak.
• Resoure Subversion - Storage. Likewise, an attaker who gained aess
to a single luster node may impliitly also gain aess to the storage
resoures of the luster. The storage may be used to house and serve
warez, pornography or other illegal material. This is espeially severe
if the attaker gains enough aess to open an unproteted port on the
luster through whih suh onnetions an be handled.
4.1.2 Integrity
Integrity ensures that all modiations done to the data are done by entities
that are authorized to do so. Integrity attaks violate this ondition by enabling
modiation for entities not approved for doing so. Modiation is understood
to mean reating, hanging, appending, writing and deleting user and meta
data.
• Internal Network Paket Injetion. An attaker who gains aess to the
internal network of luster an use it to send legitimate-looking pakets
with inorret data to other nodes. For example, the attaker may attempt
to subvert a omputation by sending pakets with inorret data in them.
• Sheduler Tampering. An attaker who has gained administrative aess to
the sheduler may tamper with it, in order to preempt other jobs running
on the luster (this an also be lassied as an availability attak), or to
give his own job higher priority.
• Log Tampering. Cooperative lusters often alloate a quota of omputing
yles for eah user. By tampering with logs, an attaker an modify other
people's remaining quotas or his own quota, if the attaker is a legitimate
user.
• Data Tampering. With a signiantly authorative aess, the attaker
an modify user data on the storage nodes at a whim. In lieu of suient
bakup, this an be partiularly disasterous, sine data residing on the
storage nodes is generally the result of hundreds of hours of omputations.
4.1.3 Availability
Availability ensures that the resoures are available to people who are authorized
to aess them when they wish to aess them. The goal of an availability attak
is to make the resoure unavailable to the intended users - what is knows as
a Denial of Servie attak. Unlike Condentiality and Integrity, whih have
been extensively studied and modeled, availability is a more eeting property
to dene.
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• Exhausting Log Spae. Depending on the luster onguration, exhausting
log spae may be an eetive availability attak if the luster is ongured
to rejet any submitted jobs that it is unable to log.
• Exhausting Srath Spae. An impropertly ongured luster may allow
users to store data on the same partition that is used for omputation
srath spae by the luster. Exhausting this spae will ause the luster
to have insuient disk storage to exeute a job.
• Exhausting Storage Spae. An attaker may attempt to ompeletely ll
up the existing storage spae, making it impossible for legitimate users to
store the results of their jobs.
• Sheduling DoS. An attaker may shedule a repetetive, non-expiring job
(suh as a simple program with an innite loop) to run on all the om-
puting nodes of the luster, thus denying legitimate users the ability to
launh jobs.
5 Summary and Conlusions
In this paper, we have presented a threat model for luster omputing. Com-
puting lusters dier from traditional networks in design and approah, and
present a unique seurity hallenge ompared to them. Additionally, a luster
has several properties whih make it a highly desirable target for an attak. In
their urrent state, many lusters have a shell of varying runhiness on the
outside, and a very soft, unproteted inside. We presented a CIA model whih
demonstrates that upon breaking into a luster through a single node, there is
very little limit imposed on what the attaker an do while inside, in terms of
Condentiality, Integrity and Availability. The inherent onlusion that an be
drawn is that while seuring the individual nodes and preventing break-ins is
important, muh eort need to be put into seuring the luster from the inside
out, with the emergent properties of luster omputing in mind.
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